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This is a case study of how the transnational cooperation between two unions – IG Metall in 
Germany and the United Automobile Workers (UAW) in the United States – was put on a new 
trajectory. It is a template for the challenges unions face in adapting their nationally oriented self-
interest toward building transnational solidarity and being able to leverage global corporate power in 
defence of workers’ interests across borders. Using the power resources approach, it highlights the 
unions’ transnational strategy built on mobilising associational and institutional resources. 
Understanding their make-up and utilisation became crucial in the process as limits to institutional 
power without involvement and mobilisation on the ground became evident. The case study focuses 
on the initiation and preparation phase of a more comprehensive organisational cooperation, 
culminating in a formal agreement to establish a Transnational Partnership Initiative (TPI) in 2015. 
While no organising gains were made in this phase – indeed, only losses – it was crucial for building 
trust and mutual understanding, as well as for actively promoting a broadly based anchoring of the 
TPI in terms of policy in both unions. The case study’s conclusions are generally positive on this 
count; yet they are preliminary as the overall project is a work-in-progress and its basis of support 
beyond the two unions (societal power) is still untested.  
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In the history of the United States (US) labour movement, the United Auto Workers (UAW) has 
played a leading role. Its success in unionising the industry in the 1930s laid the groundwork for the 
substantial gains made by labour across many sectors following World War II. The UAW established 
itself as a powerful organisational fixture representing workers’ interests at the three major US auto 
manufacturers – General Motors (GM), Ford and Chrysler, the so-called Big Three – as well as at 
their major suppliers. But since the 1980s its influence has waned, as it proved unable to extend its 
power base to the plants built by Japanese, Korean and German auto-makers (so-called 
“transplants”) in the southern American states with their low wage levels and anti-union politics.  
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Following his election in 2010, UAW President Bob King set his union’s efforts to organise the 
transplants by reaching out to their home-country unions. Most encouraging was the response of IG 
Metall in Germany, a union of over 2.2 million members throughout the metal, woodworking and 
textile industries. Its institutional power, anchored in its extended collective bargaining coverage and 
flanked by company works council and supervisory board mandates was regarded as a “game 
changer” in the UAW’s goal of gaining recognition at Volkswagen, Mercedes (Daimler) and BMW. 
Although relations had not been close for many years, and at times even antagonistic, King’s 
initiative resonated particularly well in IG Metall’s International Department. Its director saw an 
opportunity to build a stronger relationship with the UAW and for IG Metall to take a more active 
role in supporting UAW recognition efforts at the new Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee, and at the Mercedes plant in Alabama. Within IG Metall, this engagement could be 
framed in terms of contributing to the membership-driven policy orientation of enhancing 
associational power (Wetzel, 2013). As such, support of the UAW’s self-interest could be articulated 
in terms of the IG Metall’s own self-interest. Although not yet a coherently argued new approach to 
transnational partnerships, both unions were laying the groundwork for what eventually culminated 
in a greater organisational commitment to increasing transnational cooperation following the UAW’s 
crucial organising defeat at Volkswagen. In the spring and summer of 2015, the governing bodies of 
the UAW and IG Metall established a Transnational Partnership Initiative (TPI). The purpose of the 
TPI is to “collaborate to improve wages and working conditions for employees at German-owned 
auto manufacturers and suppliers in the U.S. South” and to “expand on the principle of ‘co-
determination’ between management and employees by establishing German-style works councils or 
similar bodies to promote employee representation” (UAW, 2015b).  
This case study deals with the laying of the groundwork that led to the establishment of the 
TPI, which is currently still a “work in progress”. In time, the steps taken in this phase will put the 
transnational cooperation of the two unions on a new trajectory and provide an opportunity for 
exploring challenges of building a viable organisational basis for transnational union cooperation. 
Academic interest in labour’s leverage in global value chains has been growing (for example: 
Newsome, Bair and Rainnie, 2015; Niforou, 2015), and there is an increasingly large body of case 
studies on transnational solidarity to draw on (among the more recent: Fairbrother, Hennebert and 
Lévesque, 2013; McCallum, 2013; Fichter and McCallum, 2015). But with few notable exceptions 
(Lévesque and Murray, 2010a; Brookes, 2013, 2015, 2017), the power resource approach as it was 
used in the project on Trades Unions in Transformation (initiated by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
[FES], 2017) is largely absent from the analysis of trade union transnationalism (see Introduction to 
this Special Issue).  
In particular, this case sheds light on the many operational challenges of cross-border 
cooperation, especially when it is meant to be linked to policy and decision-making at the local and 
national levels within each union. Using the power resources framework provides insights into these 
challenges by highlighting the relational nature of power along with the interdependency of 
structural, associational, institutional and societal power resources. The question of strategically 
mobilising power resources will be addressed using a catalogue of capabilities introduced by 
Lévesque and Murray (2010b).  
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The case study is based on public and internal union documents, interviews,1 and my personal 
experiences as a consultant and participant observer. It begins with a general introduction to the 
national and transnational context of the two unions’ responses to the globalisation of the auto 
industry. This is followed by a presentation of the UAW’s plan to organise the German transplants. 
The third section covers the implementation of the plan up to the stunning organising defeat at the 
Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga in February 2014. Sections four and five then focus on the 
responses of the two unions to this defeat and the development of a more comprehensive 
commitment to transnational cooperation. The final section uses the power resources approach to 
provide a critical reflection and analysis of the results and successes of this case, remembering at the 
same time that it represents only one phase – albeit a highly important one – in a more 
comprehensive “work in progress”. While cross-border cooperation and solidarity were given an 
organisational and conceptual boost, its effectiveness, and sustainability, will depend heavily on the 
extent to which the active involvement of members in both unions can be developed. 
 
 
UAW and IG Metall: Background and Context  
Since the 1980s both the UAW and IG Metall had been grappling with the challenges of 
globalisation and automation. Both faced outsourcing, offshoring and the spread of temporary 
agency work, but there were important differences in context and policy. Up to the 1980s, UAW’s 
membership had grown steadily, reaching a peak of over 1.5 million members in 1979. However, by 
2000, the UAW had lost 56 per cent of its membership due to automation, the offshoring of jobs in 
the auto industry and the increase in non-union plants at suppliers and foreign manufacturers. At the 
time of King’s election, UAW membership was below 400 000. King saw the future of the union 
endangered if this trend were to continue. Speaking to a union conference in January 2011, King told 
the delegates, “If we don’t organize these transnationals, I don’t think there’s a long-term future for 
the UAW, I really don’t” (quoted in Thomas, 2011: n.p.). 
Since the 1980s, Japanese, Korean and German manufacturers have been opening new 
production sites (and drawing in suppliers) in the US South,2 where wages are significantly lower and 
unions are hamstrung by legal restrictions (the so-called “right-to-work laws”)3 and under siege by 
employers’ aggressive anti-unionism. Today, foreign transplants employ about 75 000 workers and 
account for more than half of US auto production. None of them has a recognised union or a 
collective agreement. The situation at auto suppliers, where three out of four American auto workers 
are employed (Ruckelshaus and Leberstein, 2014), is not much better (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 
2004; Aschoff, 2012: 137; Ruckelshaus and Leberstein, 2014). While the UAW maintained its 
                                                 
1 The interviews were conducted under the condition that they would be used as background information and 
not be cited. 
2 The auto industry grew in Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi 
(Rubinstein, 2000; Rubinstein and Kochan, 2001). 
3 Right-to-work laws exist in over half of the 50 US states. While federal law requires legally recognised trade 
unions to represent and bargain on behalf of all employees in a bargaining unit (plant or company), whether 
they are union members or not, right-to-work laws at the state level allow non-members to avoid paying any 
fees in support of union representation activities.  
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collective bargaining arrangements with the Big Three, it has been unable to extend this institutional 
power to cover the transplants. Prior to King’s presidency, the UAW lost organising drives at BMW 
(Spartanburg, Georgia), Honda (Marysville, Ohio), Nissan (Smyrna, Tennessee) and Mercedes 
(Vance, Alabama). None of these was marked by substantial involvement of international unions or 
unions from the transplant’s home country. Nor did institutional contacts gained through 
supervisory board positions at Opel in Germany, or at DaimlerChrysler in the United States lead to 
organisationally anchored transnational policies.4 As more than one high-ranking UAW staff member 
noted, the 1980s and 1990s were a time when the UAW’s arrogance regarding its supposed 
associational and institutional power at home isolated it transnationally. Internationalism was 
promoted, but it was the domestically driven policies that counted (Logue, 1980).  
During the 1980s, IG Metall was also confronted with a number of challenges – automation, 
work reorganisation, outsourcing and offshoring. But market conditions were different in Europe 
and job loss was in no way comparable to the United States. IG Metall had come out of a series of 
conflicts in the 1970s in a much stronger position than the UAW to cope with these changes. 
Organisationally, it was holding its own. During the 1980s, membership hovered at around 2.6 
million, with some 40 per cent of union members employed in the auto industry. And institutionally, 
the West German setting of labour relations, with its industrial unions and industry-wide contract 
agreements, not only provided a more comprehensive and stable environment for negotiating change 
but worked as a deterrent to foreign automakers (Turner, 1991). IG Metall developed extensive 
policy programmes for “rationalisation protection” and “group work”, and despite bitter employer 
resistance successfully conducted a long strike and mobilised public support for cutting weekly hours 
from 40 down to 35 (Silvia, 2013: 122). 
Organisational challenges unleashed by the demise of the Soviet bloc and the subsequent 
unification process largely absorbed the German unions during the decade of the 1990s (Fichter, 
1997). The formerly stable world of the “German model” of labour relations was being undermined 
as German industry took advantage of the new investment opportunities and the lucrative low-wage 
labour markets in eastern Germany and in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to expand 
and relocate. Often the mere threat of relocation sufficed to force through more flexibility and opt-
outs in union contracts. While union institutional power proved to be unable to prevent the 
government from deregulating the labour market and promoting temporary agency work, IG Metall 
was still able to protect its core positions, even in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–
2008, which disrupted auto production in Germany and threatened to leave tens of thousands of 
auto workers unemployed. Indeed, it seems that the union was even able to strengthen its base (Silva, 
2013: 170ff). 
At the end of the 1990s, the merger between Daimler AG and the Chrysler Corporation 
ostensibly offered an opportunity for the two unions to close ranks, but the result was greater 
acrimony. As the corporate merger increasingly grew into an economic fiasco, neither the UAW nor 
IG Metall found common ground for cooperation.  
Nevertheless, with the three major German car manufacturers (BMW, Mercedes and 
Volkswagen) dedicated to having production facilities in the United States, and major US auto 
                                                 
4 UAW representation on the board of DaimlerChrysler was, however, used to secure a card check/neutrality 
agreement at Daimler Trucks North America that led to the recognition of the UAW at one of the largest 
plants in North Carolina. 
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suppliers (Delphi, Visteon and VDO) expanding operations in Germany, IG Metall felt that it was 
necessary to work with the UAW. By the end of 2008, with the union under new leadership, IG 




UAW: New Leadership and a Bold Plan for the Twenty-first Century 
Bob King framed the task of organising the foreign auto makers (the transplants) in the context of a 
new UAW. The “UAW of the twenty-first century must be fundamentally and radically different 
from the UAW of the twentieth century”, King (2010: n.p.) stated. In order to “address the 
challenges of rebuilding a global middle class”, the UAW had to recognise that “flexibility, 
innovation, lean manufacturing and continuous cost improvement are paramount in the global 
marketplace”. The lesson of cooperation with the Big Three in overcoming the crisis of 2008–2009 
was so positive, he believed, that the twenty-first century UAW “no longer views these managements 
as our adversaries or enemies, but as partners in innovation and quality. Our new relationships with 
these employers are built upon a foundation of respect, shared goals, and a common mission”. King 
also expressly welcomed the foreign auto makers…  
 
…as partners and colleagues in the industry. We appreciate the fact that you are providing good jobs 
here. We admire many of your good policies and practices, including the focus on continuous 
improvement, quality and productivity. The transplants are an important and essential part of 
preserving, maintaining and growing our manufacturing base in this country (King, 2010: n.p.).  
 
But at the same time, too many employers had chosen to make the United States “union free”, 
counteracting workers’ rights to free speech as guaranteed by the US Constitution. And for that 
reason, the UAW was ready to take action to defend “the principle of a fair secret-ballot election in 
which workers can decide freely whether or not to join the union” (King, 2010; see also Grossfield, 
2011). 
Shortly thereafter, the UAW published its Principles for Fair Union Elections, which sought to 
create a level playing field in the increasingly acrimonious process of union recognition resulting 
from employer “union-busting” attacks (Logan, 2006). In that document, the UAW (2011) called on 
employers to endorse eleven principles such as “no coercion”, “equal access to the electorate” and 
“no disparaging of the other party” in order for the climate of fear to be eliminated and to allow for 
“free, democratic elections”.  
For King, “rebranding” the UAW in terms of partnership and appeals to the employers to 
refrain from “union busting” needed to be complemented with union power. Thus he also spoke of 
the need to mobilise “all 1 million active and retired members in the organizing push” (quoted in 
Thomas, 2011). Equally important, the UAW needed partners. To organise the foreign transplants in 
the US South, the UAW was ready to make a concerted effort to reach out to the home-country 
unions of those foreign corporations and to enlist their support in this endeavour. King took the 
unconventional step of telling an international audience of union representatives from the auto 
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industry that the UAW needed help (Industriall, 2010: n.p.).5 And it was IG Metall that became his 
primary choice, because of its high membership density in the auto industry coupled with the 
institutional power of supervisory board members and employee representative bodies (works 
councils) at German auto manufacturers and suppliers. King had worked with IG Metall 
representatives as head of the UAW Ford department, on the supervisory board of Opel in 
Germany, and in global auto committees at the International Metalworkers’ Federation. In addition, 
King reasoned that German auto manufacturers – BMW, Daimler/Mercedes and Volkswagen – 
were more open to building cooperative relationships with the UAW because they had negotiated 
and signed global framework agreements with the unions whereas the Japanese and Korean brands 
had not (Fichter, Stevis and Helfen, 2012). To King, these agreements signalled that top management 
in the German auto industry acknowledged responsibility for upholding international labour 
standards in their global operations, whereas their US managers were unwilling to back off from their 
anti-union stance. He saw these agreements as a means for IG Metall to force German management 
to treat unions in the United States as they were treated in Germany – with respect for labour rights 
(IG Metall, 2011). Presented as it was in a cooperative spirit, this was an argument that could 
resonate in IG Metall: poor working conditions and low wages in other countries could foster 
whipsawing and be used by the auto manufacturers as a bargaining chip in contract negotiations with 
the IG Metall. 
 
 
From Plan to Action: Testing Stepped-up Cooperation  
To back up his initiative, King travelled to Germany to meet with IG Metall leaders and works 
councillors and to introduce himself to German management. This initial outreach was generally 
regarded as an “ice breaker in terms of union cooperation”, and the two unions set about planning 
joint activities in support of organising the German transplants. First, the UAW founded a new 
Global Labor Institute in early 2011 to add a global dimension to its organising drives at foreign 
transplants. Then the UAW took a select group of organisers to Germany to participate in a five-day 
joint seminar with IG Metall staff representing different departments, along with employee 
representatives from VW, Daimler and BMW. It was an important step in sharing experiences and 
building personal relationships toward working together across distinctly different settings of labour 
relations. In particular, the Germans sought a better understanding of “organising” and why it was so 
difficult to unionise the foreign transplants in the United States. For the UAW participants it was the 
role and influence of works councils that was high on the agenda. Some participants were even keen 
to talk about how to establish works councils in the United States. As a follow-up, UAW participants 
then travelled to either Volkswagen or Daimler headquarters in Germany to meet with works 
councillors and discuss plans for cooperation in their organising drives. This kind of dialogue was 
new, coming not in the midst of employer attacks but rather occurring proactively, in preparation for an 
organising drive. As such, it was a step toward developing more organisational continuity and a 
common understanding of what each participant could do, what their responsibilities were, and what 
                                                 
5 King made these remarks at an International Metalworkers Federation Automotive Working Group meeting 
in Detroit on 8–9 November 2010. The report of the meeting does not say that King literally called for help, 
but participants at the meeting confirmed this to me. 
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each side could expect from the other.  
The outcome of these stepped-up contacts differed from one German auto maker to another, 
reflecting different constellations of interests and priorities. At BMW the works-council leadership 
was not ready to invest the needed resources. The works council at Daimler was basically ready to 
support a UAW organising drive at the Mercedes plant in Alabama, but it wanted assurances from 
the UAW regarding its resolve and was cautious about the resources it could commit. And it wanted 
IG Metall headquarters staff to recognise that the extent of cooperation with the UAW would be its 
decision alone. As a first step in support, it referenced Daimler’s global framework agreement 
(DaimlerChrysler et al., 2002), calling on management to issue a statement that the company would 
remain neutral during a union organising drive, respecting the legal rights of workers to decide on 
union representation without interference from management. When top management in Germany 
ignored the request and local Mercedes management in Alabama denied access to the workplace for 
the UAW and works council representatives from Germany, UAW and the Daimler works council 
decided to move forward anyway on a joint programme of regular visits by German works 
councillors to the UAW organising committee at the US plant, participation by US worker 
representatives in the meetings of the Daimler World Employee Council, and exchanges between 
UAW representatives at the Daimler Truck plants in North Carolina and workers from the non-
union Mercedes plant in Alabama. During 2012, Daimler works councillors held week-long training 
sessions for Mercedes workers, did joint house-calls with their UAW colleagues, and published a 
UAW–IG Metall newsletter. But despite intense cooperation and a successful recognition campaign 
at a nearby supplier to Mercedes during this time, the organising drive was not gaining the support 
necessary to overcome the 50 per cent plus one hurdle needed for recognition. Workers were open 
to the idea of establishing a works council once the union had been recognised, but they feared that 
Mercedes management was not really neutral and that there would be reprisals if they openly 
supported the union.  
The real priority for the UAW, though, was the organising drive at Volkswagen. Given VW’s 
record on international labour rights and the strength of IG Metall and the works council in 
Germany, choosing to begin organising the South at VW seemed to be the most promising 
approach. Volkswagen boasted about its global agreements that recognised and secured the rights of 
its employees around the world (Volkswagen et al., 2002, 2009). In order to augment the organising 
work at the plant, King and his Director of Region 8 (the US South) began travelling to Germany 
regularly, having opened an on-going dialogue with the VW works council and the corporation’s 
human resources department. The UAW regarded this direct line of communication with VW 
headquarters as so important to its organising drive that it accepted the refusal of the VW 
participants to make these talks trilateral by including staff from IG Metall’s International 
Department.  
Talks continued for over a year in Germany, and the UAW closed in on gaining enough 
supporter signatures to claim recognition. But the plan ran into problems that ultimately cost the 
UAW a victory. For one, at the Chattanooga plant, VW’s “worker and union friendly” image was 
being undermined by an anti-union climate pushed by local management. Workers who openly 
supported union representation reported being harassed and disciplined by supervisors. The UAW 
passed on those reports to the works council and VW management in Germany, but it took over a 
year before the responsible managers in Chattanooga were finally removed. Their replacements 
ended the most blatant anti-union practices, but they could not stem the anti-union talk of line 
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supervisors and their harassment of union supporters on the shop floor. 
As the UAW–VW talks continued in Germany, another complication arose. The chairman of 
the VW works council made it clear that having a union at the plant was of less importance to him – 
and in his mind, to the company – even though, as he eventually came to realise, under US law there 
would be no works council without union recognition first. His main concern was to be able to set 
up an “in-plant body of workers’ representatives” – that is, a works council. The UAW was not at all 
opposed to having a works council; in fact, it had already started to look into the feasibility of 
transforming its own joint committee programmes negotiated in contracts with the Big Three into a 
structure along the lines of the German model. But it had to get recognition before bargaining over 
such a works council could even begin. And for that, the UAW needed the full support of the VW 
works council in Germany.  
Thirdly, the UAW had been led to believe that VW would accede to union recognition if the 
UAW could certify that it had support cards signed by over 50 per cent of the workers. However, 
when the UAW produced those cards in the autumn of 2013, VW management balked, demanding 
that a secret-ballot election be held instead. This was a setback for the UAW and a sign that there 
might be more anti-union trouble ahead. It agreed to an official election in February 2014, feeling 
confident of winning because it had the backing of IG Metall, solid support at the workplace, and an 
agreement that VW was not going to run a typical union-busting campaign. What was not part of the 
strategy – and this was the fourth problem – was that the UAW had acceded to VW’s demands that 
it refrain from community-support activities and not call on workers in their homes. So while the 
UAW maintained a publicly low profile, outside the plant a well-funded coalition of anti-union 
groups with local and national business support was waging a massive campaign against the union. 
On top of that, leading Tennessee politicians, including the governor and a US senator, weighed in 
against the UAW with threats of dire economic consequences should the UAW win. And there was 
organised resistance even inside the plant – though not officially sanctioned by VW – which spread 
dissention and uncertainty. As a result, what seemed like an almost certain win turned into a narrow, 
yet painful loss following the election on 14 February 2014 (Elk, 2014; Brooks, 2016; Silvia, 2017).  
 
 
Transnational Cooperation: From Support to a New Kind of Partnership 
The loss was a shock to both the UAW and IG Metall, a shock that triggered anger and then calls for 
a review of what had gone wrong and proposals for what to do next. Organising drives focused on 
the German auto makers had been stopped, and the approach to transnational cooperation – in 
which the UAW dealt directly with the works council at Daimler and with the works council and 
management at VW – had proven to be inadequate. IG Metall headquarters staff had built a strong 
relationship with the key UAW officials involved, but the refusal of the works councils (and VW 
management) to include IG Metall staff on an equal basis – and thus make the cooperation a 
transnational union project – had inhibited putting the project on a broader organisational basis. 
Within weeks the two unions began to outline the elements of a more comprehensive plan of 
transnational cooperation that would build on maintaining existing bases of engagement on the 
ground. Firstly, the UAW was not ready to give up on union recognition and a contract at 
Volkswagen. That remained its top priority. That meant being willing to continue a dialogue with 
VW management and the works council in Germany, as well as maintaining a presence at the VW 
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plant. It was decided to establish a new union local at the Chattanooga plant, a step the UAW 
normally took only after gaining recognition at a workplace. This was supported by IG Metall, and 
both unions agreed that a UAW local should also be established at the Mercedes plant in Alabama. 
Secondly, the focus of cooperation was broadened to include German auto suppliers located in the 
US South. For the UAW, this realignment linked well to its renewed focus on organising US auto 
suppliers. German auto suppliers employed well over 50 000 workers and had a much lower rate of 
union density (13 per cent) than auto suppliers overall (20 per cent) (Liebman, 2016: 146). For IG 
Metall’s International Department this value-chain approach presented an opportunity to involve 
other union departments dealing with the auto industry in Germany and Europe. Indeed, while 
cooperation between the two unions had improved notably since 2011, the magnitude of opposition 
to unionisation that had surfaced in Chattanooga was a clear sign that continuing with the usual form 
of transnational cooperation, run by a small group of experts from union headquarters, was not a 
recipe for success. The work of these experts had to be put on a broader organisational basis to 
enable other headquarter departments and union locals on the ground to have a stake in the project. 
And thirdly, a plan was drafted for establishing an organisational centre in the United States staffed 
from Germany for information exchange and policy development. The centre would be a focal point 
of multi-level interaction both within and between the two unions, for example by involving 
company-level union representatives from both unions and works councillors in Germany.  
 
 
Putting Partnership into Action 
It was the backing of the leadership in both unions that was decisive in making the drafting of a new 
plan based on increased activity and the investment of considerably more resources possible. Both 
unions came under new leadership after the election at Volkswagen: In the UAW, Bob King’s 
successor, Dennis Williams, kept tabs on the progress being made and voiced his support. In IG 
Metall, the election loss at VW had convinced Detlef Wetzel, who had succeeded Berthold Huber as 
chairman in 2013, that IG Metall needed to “transnationalise” its organising policy. In July 2014 the 
UAW announced the founding of Local 42 at the VW plant in Chattanooga; three months later 
Local 112 was founded at the Mercedes plant in Vance, Alabama. By the end of 2014 the UAW–IG 
Metall working group had finalised a formal agreement that was ratified by the executive boards of 
both unions in the spring of 2015. It took several more months of planning and legal work before 
the UAW and IG Metall officially opened the Transnational Labor Institute (TLI) in Spring Hill, 
Tennessee, on 19 November 2015. In its member magazine, the UAW explained that the TLI had 
two main goals to fulfil: 
 
 [The UAW and IG Metall would collaborate] to improve wages and working conditions for 
employees at German-owned auto manufacturers and suppliers in the US South. 
 Expand on the principle of ‘co-determination’ between management and employees by establishing 
German-style works councils or similar bodies to promote employee representation (UAW, 2015a: 
n.p.). 
 
IG Metall concurred, adding that the TLI would also seek to “intensify the exchange of information 
between German and US trade unions. It will develop educational programs for trade unionists and 
the interested public in order to increase mutual understanding regarding questions of trade union 
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policy and codetermination at the workplace” (IG Metall, 2015: n.p.). 
The founding of the TLI ushered in a new phase in the relationship between the two unions. 
Both were under new leadership ready to continue their support for the project. Building bilateral 
transnational cooperation by moving from sporadic to committed and institutionalised interaction 
over an extended period of time may seem to be a logical and straightforward exercise, but in the 
context of international trade unionism it is rather unique – in particular coming in the wake of the 
ominous election loss at VW. As with the campaign partnership between the German service union 
ver.di and the Communications Workers of America (CWA) to gain union recognition at the US 
telecommunications company T-Mobile (owned by Deutsche Telekom), the TLI was intentionally 
built on a partnership between only two unions. As a first step in a new phase of a transnational 
relationship, both unions argued that it was necessary to keep the partnership focused, in order to 
develop functional working arrangements and to avoid rivalries that a multi-organisational structure 
could induce. In its goals and organisational structure the TLI moves beyond the coordinating unit 
serving the ver.di–CWA partnership. In fact, as part of a larger transnational project with a second 
pilot operation in Hungary,6 the TLI is IG Metall’s bridge to the UAW and its organising drives in 
the US auto industry. By any measure, including the level of personnel and material resources 
dedicated to this project in the United States, IG Metall has committed to breaking new ground in its 
transnational policy. For the UAW, the project is part of a broader commitment to organising the 
auto industry in the US South – a make-or-break situation for salvaging the associational power of 
the union.  
As was stated at the beginning of this case study, the question of success in this phase of 
activities can only be addressed in terms of the organisational accomplishment of establishing a 
transnational partnership and not in terms of the partnership’s organising goals. The goal of 
organising the foreign transplants, initially postulated by UAW president Bob King and later 
extended to include auto suppliers, was not achieved in this phase. But that failure – above all 
signalled by the lost vote at Volkswagen – put the quest for a robust structure of transnational 
cooperation on a new and more anchored footing. Considering the difficulties of the task and the 
extent of employer resistance, this move was necessary and represented a new commitment. 
 
 
Power Resources, Capabilities and the Lessons Learned 
In this section I will use the theoretical framework of our project to address the questions of what 
factors in the development of this UAW–IG Metall partnership led to the successful creation of the 
TPI and what lessons were learned in terms of what power resources came into play and which 
capabilities were needed to make those resources available and usable. Of primary and virtually 
exclusive importance for both unions in this case study was their focus on using and strengthening 
their associational and institutional power. When Bob King assumed the presidency of the UAW, the 
union’s associational and institutional power, on which it had primarily relied, had been waning for 
nearly three decades. Not only did the UAW seem to be in an irreversible membership decline but, 
due to the foreign transplants’ growing share of auto production and the UAW’s inability to organise 
them and their suppliers, the union’s collective bargaining coverage – a key part of its institutional 
                                                 
6 See https://www.tpi-gyor.eu/?lang=de.  
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power – was diminishing. The UAW’s contracts with the US auto makers and major US auto 
suppliers no longer set standards for the auto industry as a whole, but only for less than half of it. 
Organising the transplants was the chosen strategy for membership growth and for establishing an 
organisational foothold in the US South (associational power). If successful, the UAW stood to gain 
in bargaining strength as well by extending its contract coverage (institutional power). While the 
UAW was successfully recruiting new members and building an organisational basis on the ground at 
Volkswagen (and to a lesser extent at Mercedes), it was counting on the institutional power of IG 
Metall and its works councillors to achieve the level playing field (management neutrality) it sought 
to have a chance at winning. From its organising drives the UAW concluded that the workers in the 
plants did not favour testing their structural power as a strategic option; and using societal power 
(that is, alliances) to mobilise pressure on Mercedes and Volkswagen from outside the workplace 
seemed unachievable at Mercedes and was forfeited at Volkswagen due to the conditions of dialogue 
imposed by management. Seeing no added value, both the UAW and IG Metall consciously excluded 
other US unions and the global union federation IndustriALL, of which both the UAW and IG 
Metall are important members, from their joint project. 
For Bob King and his leadership team it was not difficult to frame the revitalisation of the 
UAW in terms of organising the transplants by emphasising dialogue and cooperation built on the 
“UAW of the twenty-first century” policy. While the UAW had had cooperative, or “joint” 
programmes since the 1980s, King fashioned this as the centrepiece of organising. By prioritising it, 
King acknowledged the union’s waning associational power and lack of structural power. And as the 
UAW’s new calling card, cooperation aroused interest in IG Metall, opening the way for a process of 
intermediating differing, yet not conflicting, (self-)interests between the two unions. The UAW was 
able to diffuse criticisms based on the past and offer a way forward to the IG Metall staff members 
and works councillors who were concerned about strengthening transnational union cooperation. 
The core idea for developing transnational cooperation between the UAW and IG Metall was to 
augment the organising drives of the UAW through the institutional power of IG Metall, initially 
with regard to the corporate headquarters of Daimler/Mercedes and Volkswagen. At both 
companies, its members were in complete control of the legally mandated works councils and they 
held influential positions on the corporate supervisory boards. Working conditions and wages at 
both corporations were governed by collective agreements (including global framework agreements) 
with IG Metall. The equation seemed straightforward: IG Metall (union and works council 
representatives) would make it clear to corporate management that it was in full support of the 
UAW’s quest for recognition and that corporate management had a responsibility to ensure that local 
management would refrain from employing union-busting tactics and even agree to neutrality. But as 
events unfolded up to the February 2014 election at VW Chattanooga, it became evident that, in 
practice, this equation was flawed. First of all, the assumption that this institutional power, the result 
of local and national struggles, could be invoked equally well transnationally, was faulty. 
Transnational cooperation as a proactive and strategic policy had to be learned and integrated into 
the agendas of IG Metall’s company employee representatives. Moreover, such a strategy would have 
to recognise and develop means to contend with the structural, institutional and societal power of US 
management and politicians.7 Secondly, this power was not consolidated in the union but divided 
across organisational units and institutional bodies, with personal rivalries contributing added 
                                                 
7 See for example statements of former South Carolina governor Nikki Haley (Capizola, 2014: n.p.).  
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uncertainty. Employee representatives at each company were jealous of their institutional power, 
cautious of using it transnationally, and not ready to experiment with exercising it jointly – with each 
other or with IG Metall. Each wanted to determine the extent and progress of their relationship with 
the UAW independently.  
At Daimler and Volkswagen, management claimed that, in practice, local management was 
adhering to corporate policy. At Daimler, the response of the works council was to shift its focus, 
using its institutional power more effectively to support the UAW directly in its membership drive 
(and later in the founding of Local 112). The VW works council initially accepted management’s 
claim, and only in time, when the labour rights violations in Chattanooga could no longer be ignored, 
did it actually pressure management to intervene. That helped, but beyond that, IG Metall’s 
institutional power at VW headquarters was never really mobilised as a challenge to the power 
resources of anti-union forces in Tennessee. VW management readily jettisoned union recognition in 
exchange for enormous tax breaks and subsidies offered by politicians (institutional power) and 
backed down at their insistence from a card-check agreement with the UAW. When the UAW agreed 
to an election, the combined institutional and societal power of the politicians and anti-union 
business forces then overwhelmed the nascent associational power the UAW had built within the 
plant. 
That defeat triggered a joint process of reframing strategy and strengthening cooperation 
organisationally, while retaining the basic focus on enhancing associational and institutional power. 
While building union locals at VW and Mercedes, although with no immediate prospect of union 
recognition at either plant, the scope was widened and priority given to organising German auto 
suppliers in the US South. This required investing considerable resources, but it would be unlikely to 
draw the kind of anti-union activity mounted against the UAW in Chattanooga. The UAW leadership 
declared its readiness to bring in organising and research resources from other departments to work 
with the union’s transnational department, anchoring the project more strongly in the union. 
IG Metall’s international affairs staff argued strongly in favour of this shift in focus and for a 
greater and more comprehensive organisational commitment on the part of the union. Their 
proposals for a more effective use of the union’s associational and institutional power centred on 
transforming the project into a jointly owned UAW–IG Metall union partnership by strengthening 
the inter-union linkage through the TLI, mustering the support of other union departments dealing 
with the auto industry and building understanding of the transnational agenda among company-level 
union representatives and works councillors. To win over union leadership and justify the needed 
increase in resources, they pointed out that the partnership with the UAW was the logical and 
necessary transnational extension of IG Metall’s policy emphasis on “organising” and targeting 
“union-free zones” in Germany (Wetzel, 2013). IG Metall chairman Detlef Wetzel was an outspoken 
advocate of this policy, and the international affairs staff built their case for transnational 
cooperation on the same premise. They emphasised that international solidarity, to which IG Metall 
was unequivocally committed, was founded on self-interest. Using the idea of “vicious cycles and 
virtuous circles” (see Figure 1), it was in the self-interest of IG Metall to support union organising 
efforts in other countries. For the International Department, and eventually the union leadership, 
being better, not cheaper in Germany was a strength that in a globalised world was of limited value, 
ending at the national borders. Even if IG Metall maintained a high level of membership density in 
Germany, it was dealing with corporations operating with value chains around the globe and capable 
of organising production wherever it was most conducive to profit-making. With their technology, 
 
Global Labour Journal, 2018, 9(2), Page 194 
 
these corporations had the capacity and the incentive to be able to produce better wherever cheaper, in 
most cases avoiding unions. And as long as there were union-free zones around the world, the 
nationally bounded associational and institutional power of IG Metall would always be under 
potential threat. The union had to begin finding approaches to changing this situation. And working 
together with the UAW – a first step in this direction – seemed to offer a plausible way of testing the 
viability and conditions of such an approach. 
 
 
Source: Fichter and Mund (2015: 213) (author’s translation). 
 
Figure 1: Vicious cycles and virtuous circles of unionism in a globalised economy 
 
 
As finally constructed, the TPI as a commitment to a middle-range pilot project of transnational 
cooperation was both a result of lessons learned from the past and a step toward seeking to learn for 
the future. In the past, transnational interaction had consisted of formalised meetings of leaders, 
conferences of experts, and crisis management – none of which had proven especially conducive to 
strengthening ties and enhancing union strength. In this sense, embarking on a new trajectory of 
transnational cooperation was an expression of organisational learning and organisational flexibility. While 
its structuring as an on-going commitment and its embeddedness as a recognised element of UAW 
and IG Metall policy grew out of an understanding of past failures, its sustainability as a “learning 
factory” for the future – critical to associational power (Greven, 2016) – is yet to be determined. 
Moreover, there are important questions in this “work in progress” that need to be raised as the 
implementation phase progresses.  
One of these concerns structural power and societal power, as well as their relationship to associational 
power. When Bob King became president of the UAW, the union’s associational and institutional 
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power had diminished considerably. It was a weakened UAW that set out under its new president to 
regenerate its associational power. For the UAW leadership, that regeneration could only be 
accomplished by an offer of “peace and cooperation” based on institutional power. Although King 
had threatened in his election speech to “pound” Toyota if it refused the UAW’s offer and to 
mobilise all one million UAW members and supporters, no preparations were made to give credence 
to such threatened action. Indeed, the course of developments at the VW plant in Chattanooga 
illustrate quite well that worker/member mobilisation was not part of the plan.  
Although such a mobilising campaign would have had an impact, it would be speculative to 
claim that it could have gotten off the ground. A number of endogenous and exogenous factors 
make it seem unlikely, or at least extremely difficult – for example, the deeply rooted focus of union 
leadership on cooperation with management on the one hand, and the unregulated and 
heterogeneous nature of the vast US labour market on the other. Developing conflict potential and 
direct participation of workers on the ground to complement the superstructure of partnership has 
not been an essential part of the plan but, as Mark Anner (2011: 71) has concluded from his research 
on several transnational campaigns in Latin America, “transnationalism, without mobilization on the 
ground, would be unable to articulate sustainable demands at the factory level”. 
With regard to associational and societal power, the framing, intermediating and articulating of 
the strategy and its goals stayed enclosed within the organisational hierarchies of the UAW and IG 
Metall. And in the cases of Volkswagen and Mercedes, the opportunity to reach out to prospective 
labour-friendly supporters in the area was rejected in order not to pressure those corporate managers 
at Volkswagen and Mercedes with whom the UAW wished to negotiate and from whom they 
expected recognition. That left the partnership vulnerable to the whims of those corporate managers 
and the massive attacks of anti-union business interests. Furthermore, it raised questions about a 
strategy of relying on the institutional power of IG Metall. That power is not readily exercised 
beyond its bounded existence within the national/corporate setting. In theory, it looks impressive, 
but as experiences from recent organising drives at German auto supply plants in the United States 
show, mobilising such institutional power towards building successful transnational cooperation is a 
time-consuming, complex and multi-level process in which a successful outcome is almost always 
uncertain.  
The transnational partnership is now operational and moving forward, and so the relevance of 
such questions and reflections is growing and coming under renewed consideration. The TPI is a 
work in progress, the full evaluation of which is not yet possible. But only after a substantial period 
of implementation will its relative importance as a contribution to growing transnational associational 
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